It would help to distinguish between at least three broad types of markets: financial markets which trade risk; goods and service markets which trade products between businesses and to households; and public service markets which provide government funded services but are not necessarily managed by government agencies (and could for example be run for profit).
Even such a simple definition shows how silly the politics has already got. When Sarkozy talks of the end of capitalism he’s beginning to slide into the goods and services territory – and to industry protection and state support policy. Even more bizarrely, the recently-dug-up speech which Brown gave at the SMF in 2003 is very much focused on the use and limits of markets in public services and is not a general theory of markets. (Amusingly it also talks a lot about the problem of state failure replacing market failure, a risk probably rising in significance daily.)
This ‘contagion’ effect is unfortunate: the financial crisis has some very specific and technical causes and shouldn’t lead us to hasty conclusions about the operation of goods and service markets (and junking long established competition policy) nor about public service markets (and putting unnecessary brakes on bringing the benefits of markets into public services when and where they can add value). In so far as there are general lessons about markets to be found from the financial crisis it’s the importance of good information for them to work effectively and of careful ‘agent-design’ (e.g. that the bank knows who the ‘right’ people to lend to are, and there’s no third party ready to benefit from misselling). But we knew all this already and the three broad market types I described each have specific features and come with very detailed theory as well as evidence and practice in how they work.
Perhaps it’s a good example of how societies – and politicians – respond to crises:
- We have to find historical precedence: so the current economic crisis is rivalled only by the Great Depression of the 1930s. (Actually it’s a poor comparison: we remember the Great Depression for the one in three who became unemployed and the almost half pushed below the poverty line, a human consequence that the current problems will have nothing to compare to, and not the fall in stock values.)
- We must all somehow be affected: perhaps this is some sort of solidarity effect, or maybe that people are perversely jealous of the attention a crisis gets. But it’s amusing that almost everyone is trying to claim relevance to the credit crisis at the moment. I’ve lost count of the number of times I’ve recently heard policy makers say things like “in the current turbulent times [environment/ social/ education/ insert random policy area] is now more important than ever”. Why don’t we just let the macroeconomists have their moment in the limelight and acknowledge that constitutional reform or what’s in the school curriculum isn’t the most pressing issue right now?
- Something must be done: we have to find the general lessons and apply them in all forms and in all places. So we get an equal and opposite reaction with for example politicians getting lukewarm on markets in public services. This is also a particularly common response following disasters whether natural or man-made with disproportionate reactions like with health and safety measures that represent extremely poor levels of cost-effectiveness.
- Obfuscation and denial of the root cause: a sensible reaction would be to say something’s gone wrong with (parts of) financial markets therefore we need to (1) stop this from worsening (2) limit the consequences elsewhere (3) reduce the chance of this happening again. We’re close to doing (1) now and attention is beginning to shift to doing (2) and (3) through fiscal measures and regulatory and banking reform. This will expend enough political time and effort without trying to fix all other areas of life with some element of market in. Arguably, even talking about the failure of ‘financial markets’ is far too loose a description – it is only some elements we now have problems with that will require fixing (e.g. subprime mortgages, derivative swaps) and the rest is effect on rather than cause of.
Anyhow I’ll be listening closely at the conference to whether (and for how long) each speaker drones on in generalities about the financial crisis and attempts to make convoluted links to other areas. I suspect the politicians will be the worst offenders...


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